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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LUETTA K. LISKA,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 940180 - CA

v.
MICHAEL A. LISKA,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the District Court should have sustained the Commissioner's recommendation

to decline jurisdiction based upon findings which are not supported by any record or
evidence. This issue is a mixed question of fact and law. The standards of review are
"substantial evidence" for the question of fact and "correction of error" for the question of
law. See George v. Peterson, 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983) (factual issues); Western Kane
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) (legal
issues).
2. Whether the District Court's adoption of the Commissioner's recommendation to decline
jurisdiction which was based solely upon communication with another state's trial court
magistrate of which no record was kept and in which Defendant did not participate violates
1

the notice and opportunity to be heard provision of the Utah Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act. This issue is strictly a question of law and is reviewable under the
"correction of error" standard. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co.} 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); In re D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
3.

Whether the process used by the District Court in which a Commissioner conducts a

conference call with another state's trial court magistrate deprives the appellant of fhis right to
due process of law. This issue is strictly a question of law and is reviewable under the
"correction of error" standard. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); In re D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
4.

Whether the process used by the District Court in which a Commissioner conducts a

conference call with another state's trial court magistrate violates the Open Courts provision
of Utah's Constitution. This issue is strictly a question of law and is reviewable under the
"correction of error" standard. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); In re D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article L Section 7, Utah Constitution.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article L Section 11, Utah Constitution.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.

2

Section 78-45c-4. Utah Code Annotated.
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose rights have not been previously
terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these
persons is outside the state, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant
to Section 78-45c-5.
Section 78-45c-7. Utah Code Annotated.
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modification
decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it
finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the
circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the
interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take
into account the following factors, among others:
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or
with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in
another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate;
and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any
of the purposes stated in section 78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may
communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will
be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the
parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state
is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the
proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in
another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just and proper,
including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission to the
3

jurisdiction of the other forum.
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody
determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while
retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may require
the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the
proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the clerk of the
court for remittance to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall inform the
court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would
have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, shall transmit the
information to the court administrator or other appropriate official for forwarding to
the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of a finding
of inconvenient forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall
be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction
the court of this state shall inform the original court of this fact.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal is from a final order of the Third District Court sustaining the
recommendation of the Commissioner to defer jurisdiction to Colorado under the Utah
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
Statement of Facts
1.

Plaintiff/Appellee Luetta Liska and Defendant/Appellant Mike Liska resided in Salt

Lake County before January 1989 as husband and wife. Mike Liska currently resides in Utah.
(R00307, R00371).
2.

Luetta Liska moved with the parties' two minor children to Loveland, Colorado, early

in 1989. (R00044).
4

3.

Luetta Liska filed for divorce in the Third District Court of Utah on or about January

26, 1989. (R00002-11).
4.

A number of orders and recommendations were entered by the Utah court and a final

decree of divorce was made and entered in October 1990. (R00060-62, R00079, R00106,
R00120-22, R00123-24, R000126, R00177, R00181, R00192, R00196, R00199, R00318-24).
5.

The divorce decree provided for Mike Liska's visitation with his children. (R00319).

6.

Beginning in November 1990, Mike Liska experienced difficulty in exercising normal

court ordered visitation with his children. (R00371-80).
7.

Luetta Liska filed an action in Colorado seeking orders to prevent Mike Liska from

exercising his scheduled visitation in June 1992. (R00400-02). Ultimately, the orders were
dissolved. (R00441-45).1
8.

Mike Liska filed an Order to Show Cause to enforce his visitation rights in the Third

District Court on March 18, 1993. (R00476-77).
9.

A hearing was set for Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause. However, upon hearing that

an emergency order had been filed in Colorado and before any arguments had been made, the
Commissioner declined to rule on Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause and indicated that she
was going to confer with the Colorado court. (R00446).
10.

The Commissioner entered a minute entry May 11, 1993 deferring jurisdiction. The

minute entry indicated that communication with the Colorado court had occurred. (R0047273).

1

The record contains an apparently misfiled separate order in the middle of the dissolution
order at R00442.
5

11.

Mike Liska objected to the Commissioner's recommendation on May 24, 1993.

(R00478-84).
12.

The trial court stayed the Commissioner's recommendation on June 1, 1993 based

upon Mike Liska's objection. (R00485-86).
13.

On August 16, 1993, the trial court referred the case to the Commissioner for findings

of fact in support of the recommendation to decline jurisdiction. The minute entry reflecting
this order did not appear in the official court file. Therefore, the trial court entered an order
on November 15, 1993 reflecting the action taken on August 16. (R00515-16).
14.

On December 14, 1993, the Commissioner made findings concerning her

recommendation to decline the exercise of Utah jurisdiction. (R00524-25).
15.

Over Mike Liska's objection, the trial court adopted the Commissioner's

recommendation on February 7, 1994 (minute entry dated January 18, 1994), and stayed all
Utah proceedings. The trail court's stated that its order constituted a Rule 54(b) judgment.
(R00529, R00530-31).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
The Commissioner made a recommendation that the Utah courts defer jurisdiction to
Colorado. This recommendation was accompanied by findings that were not supported by
evidence. The trial court sustained the Commissioner's recommendation without reviewing
the basis for it. Commissioners are empowered to "recommend" not "decide." Therefore, the
trial court should have undertaken an independent review of the findings. Absent such
review, the trial court's sustaining of the Commissioner's recommendation was improper.
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II.
The procedure used by the Commissioner violated the notice and opportunity to be
heard provision of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The Commissioner
communicated with the Colorado courts without maintaining a record or giving Mike Liska an
opportunity to be present. As a quasi-judicial officer, the Commissioner is required to follow
certain procedures to protect Mike Liska's rights. Because the procedure used by the
Commissioner violated the notice and opportunity to be heard requirement of the Utah
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the trial court's sustaining of the Commissioner's
recommendation to defer jurisdiction was improper.
III.
Mike Liska has certain interests that are protected by the Due Process clause of the
Utah Constitution. These interests include the right to his relationship with his children and
the right of access to Utah courts. By recommending deferral of jurisdiction to Colorado, the
Commissioner determined that Utah would not offer Mike Liska a forum to protect these
rights. Since Mike Liska was not afforded any opportunity to participate in the
Commissioner's proceedings to determine if deferral of jurisdiction should be recommended,
his protected rights were denied without due process of law. Therefore, the acceptance of
the recommendation by the trial court was unconstitutional.
IV.
Mike Liska also has constitutional claims under the Open Courts provision.

By

refusing to enforce a Utah order for visitation, Mike Liska has been denied a remedy of an
injury to his "person, property, or reputation." The nature of this denial merits heightened

7

scrutiny of his claims because his rights have been completely impaired and his relationship
with his children (a constitutionally protected interest) is affected. The statute which allowed
deferral of jurisdiction over his request for enforcement of visitation under a Utah divorce
decree deprives him of access to Utah courts. The legislature has provided no effective and
reasonable alternative for vindication of his rights. Further, deferral of jurisdiction in this
case is arbitrary and unreasonable means of pursuing the statutory objectives.
Mike Liska has a second claim under the Open Courts provision. The Commissioner's
proceedings to determine whether to recommend deferral of jurisdiction were made without
affording Mike Liska access. Therefore, the procedure used by the Commissioner violated the
constitutional mandate that "All courts shall be open."
ARGUMENT2
I.

THE RECORD AND EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION ARE INADEQUATE AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL
COURT'S ADOPTION OF THE RECOMMENDATION WAS IN ERROR.
The Commissioner made her recommendation based upon the Utah Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA or Act).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 78-45c-l to 26 (1992 &

Supp. 1993). Section 7 of the UCCJA allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in
favor of another court with jurisdiction. Id. § 78-45c-7 (1992). Based upon the
Commissioners recommendation, the trial judge entered an order deferring jurisdiction over
Mike Liska's request for enforcement of visitation.

2

Plaintiff/Appellee has not participated in these proceedings previously. If she does not file
a brief, Defendant/Appellant's counsel plans to file a list of cases, in the form prescribed
in UTAH R. APP. P. 24(j), contrary to some of Defendant/Appellant's arguments. This list
is intended to help the Court to evaluate Defendant/Appellant's argument.
8

Although Utah courts have not addressed the issue directly, other jurisdictions have
held that a decision to decline jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
is within the trial court's discretion. See e.g. Brown v. Brown, 486 A.2d 1116 (Conn. 1985);
In re. Bolton, 690 P.2d 401 (Mont. 1984). Assuming that Utah would reach a similar
conclusion, the trial court is still required to make adequate findings of fact based upon the
evidence to support its exercise of discretion. This Court has addressed the necessity of the
trial court establishing an adequate record in a similar area of trial court discretion, child
custody determinations. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986).
Proper findings of fact ensure that the ultimate custody award follows logically
from, and is supported by, the evidence and the controlling legal principles.
Adequate findings are also necessary for this Court to perform its assigned
review function.
Id. at 426. Without a proper foundation in record and evidence, the findings made by the
Commissioner and adopted by the trial court when it sustained the Commissioner's
recommendation are inadequate.3
Appellant suggests that it is appropriate to require an evidentiary hearing concerning
issues of deferral. The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that a trial court order stating that
Hawaii was an inconvenient forum was unfounded because no evidentiary hearing was
conducted. Allen v. Allen, 645 P.2d 300, 307 (Hawaii 1982) (dicta).4 The nature of domestic

3

Mike Liska recognizes that generally a party challenging a trial court's findings of fact
is required to marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate the
evidence's insufficiency. Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah
1985). However, the lack of a record of the Commissioner's fact finding makes this
support impossible.

4

The court's discussion of the forum non conveniens provision of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act was unnecessary because the court determined that Hawaii did
9

relations commissioners1 authority requires that the recommendations made be subject to de
novo review when a party objects. Commissioners are empowered to "recommend' in areas
prescribed by the Judicial Council and may not enter final orders unless provided by law or
the Judicial Council. UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78-3-3l(6)(b)(i) & (9) (1992). Commissioners may

make "recommendations" in domestic relations matters but may not make final adjudications
except in default or uncontested divorces.5

UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.

R. 6-401(2)(D) &

(6)(A). The Utah Supreme Court has found commissioners to be "analogous" to masters
appointed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743
(Utah 1990). The court's potential responses to a master's report in a non-jury action are as
follows:
The court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it
in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with
instructions.
UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 53(e)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 53 outlines an appropriate proceeding for a

court's review of non-binding recommendations. In contrast, an adoption of the
Commissioner's recommendation without an independent evidentiary hearing on Mike Liska's
objection is equivalent of rubber stamping the Commissioner's recommendation ancl allowing
the Commissioner to make the final order.

not have jurisdiction over the custody dispute.
5

One judge of this Court has opined that allowing commissioners to issue any orders may
be an unconstitutional vesting of judicial power. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 167
n.5 (Russon, J.).
10

II

THE TRIAL COURT'S ADOPTION OF THE COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION VIOLATED THE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT.
All decrees under the UCCJA must give parents "reasonable notice and opportunity to

be heard" to be valid. Id. § 78-45c-4 (1992). Mike Liska and his attorney were not present
at the only information gathering phase of the proceedings surrounding Mike Liska's Order to
Show Cause, i.e. communication with the Colorado magistrate. Further, contrary to this
Court's admonition concerning communication with other states pursuant to Section 7, the
Commissioner failed to "make a prompt written record of [her] conclusions and . . . [set forth]
the basis for any agreement . . . clearly in the record." In re. D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 127-28
n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Allen, 645 P.2d at 307 (substance of conversation of Hawaian court
with New Jersey court should ahve been made a matteer of record).
Other jurisdictions have considered the process required by Section 4 of the Uniform
Act. Maintenance of a record is essential, even in the sensitive area of questioning children.
See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 458 A.2d 1257 (Md Ct. App. 1983) (interview of child without
consent or presence of parent proper if record kept). Evidentiary hearings are required to give
the parties an opportunity to be heard. See Swartsell v. Swartsell, 615 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (temporary custody order); Vogt v. Altman, 428 So. 2d 267 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (order after interviewing daughter and psychiatrist without allowing
father to put on rebuttal evidence improper); Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 1075 (Perin. Super.
1992) (trial court erred by not holding hearing before adopting conciliator's agreement).
Domestic Relations Commissioners are quasi-judicial officers of the court.
ANN.

§78-3-31 (1992);

UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.

11

UTAH CODE

R. 3-201. The Supreme Court has

addressed the record keeping requirements of quasi-judicial officers. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d
734 (Utah 1990). The trial court in Plumb appointed a special master pursuant to Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 53 (the scope of the master's appointment was strongly contested). The
master recommended to the trial court that the fees awarded to the class counsel under a class
action settlement be reduced. One of the bases of the class counsel's objections to the
recommendation was the nature of the proceedings conducted by the master. The class
counsel was never given notice of the reassessment of the fee award by the master. Also, the
class counsel was not given an opportunity to present any evidence on the issue until after the
recommendation to the judge. The Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its
discretion6 by adopting the findings of the master after being informed of the lack of notice
and insufficient opportunity to be heard. Id. at 743.
Another aspect of Plumb is relevant in this case. The Supreme Court indicated that
evidence presented by the class counsel demonstrated that the special master had engaged in
ex parte communication with the trial judge and other people not parties to the case. The
court suggested that such conduct, if substantiated, would be "clearly improper." Id. at 742.
The special master was subject to the ethical obligations of other judicial officers. Id. at 743.
However, the court did not base its decision on the possible ex parte communications;
instead, it relied upon the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard discussed above. Id.
Plumb is highly persuasive in the case before the Court. The Supreme Court noted

6

The court noted that the procedures used by the master may have violated due process.
Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743 ("Regardless of whether the procedures in this case are so
extreme as to deny class counsel the due process guaranteed under article I, section 7, we
find that, at a minimum, the trial court abused its discretion . . . .) (footnote omitted;
emphasis added).
12

that the special master is "most analogous" to a commissioner. Id. Much of the conduct
censured by the court in Plumb has occurred in this case. The trial court, by accepting the
Commissioner's recommendation, decided to deny Mike Liska recourse in Utah courts without
a hearing. This decision violated the requirements of the UCC JA that notice and opportunity
to be heard be granted before any decree is entered. Also, the Commissioner conferred with
the Colorado court ex parte and failed to record the conversation. Mike Liska suggest that
the flaws in the procedure used by the Commissioner so tainted her recommendation that
acceptance of the recommendation was error as a matter of law.
III.

THE PROCEDURE USED BY THE COMMISSIONER TO DETERMINE THAT
UTAH COURTS WOULD NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
A.

Appellant possesses rights protected by the Due Process clause of the Utah
Constitution.

The Utah Constitution ensures that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."

UTAH CONST,

art. I, sec. 7. The issues in this case

involve procedural due process. "Most due process cases concern procedural requirements,
notably notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid
proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681
P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The procedure necessary
varies depending upon the case and the parties involved. Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d
338, 341 (Utah 1980) ("The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.").
The due process clause of the Utah Constitution is implicated any time the government

13

makes factual determinations affecting a person's fundamental interests. Concerned
Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982). In this case, two
fundamental interests of Mike Liska are implicated. The first fundamental interest held by
Mike Liska is the right to visitation with his children. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the parent-child relationship is fundamental right. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
As the noncustodial parent, Mike Liska's relationship with his children is sustained by
visitation ordered by the Utah court in the 1990 divorce decree. This right to visitation is
fundamental and should not be abrogated without due process. See Barron v. Barron, 834
P.2d 685, 688 (Wyo. 1992) ("Husband had a legitimate liberty interest in these visitation
rights which was protected by the Constitution of the United States, and by the Constitution
of the State of Wyoming.") (footnotes omitted).7
The second protected interest possessed by Mike Liska is the right to access to the
courts protected by the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

UTAH CONST,

art. I,

sec. II. 8 The recognition of the right to access to court in the Constitution elevates the right
to one of "life, liberty or property" protected by the due process clause. See McGrew v.
Industrial Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938) quoting Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620
(1885) ("The words "life,' liberty,' and 'property' are constitutional terms, and are to be taken

7

Wyoming's due process clause is identical to Utah's.

8

The Open Courts provision states
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to* him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself
or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
14

in their broadest sense.") (emphasis deleted). The due process and access to courts clauses in
the Utah Constitution are complementary but not duplicative. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
Ill P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985).
B.

Appellant's fundamental rights have been deprived without due process of law.

The Commissioner in this case decided that the Utah courts would not hear Mike
Liska's motion to enforce visitation set out in a previous order by a Utah court. This decision
was based upon a conference with the Colorado court to which Mike Liska was not a party
and of which no record was kept. In another case before this court concerning the UCCJA,
the court held that due process required a hearing before a undomesticated foreign order could
be enforced. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Holm involved Section 6 of the Act that requires a court to stay a proceeding if a
custody proceeding is pending in another jurisdiction. UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78-45c-6 (1992).

The parties were divorced in Ohio but both had moved from that state. The mother moved to
Utah with the parties' child and filed the Ohio divorce decree under the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act. The father (a North Carolina resident) had filed a petition for change of
custody in Ohio. Although the mother had not been properly served, the Ohio court granted
the father's petition. The father entered Utah with the Ohio order (not filed under the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act) and demanded that custody be relinquished to him. The mother's
attorney contacted the Commissioner who said that Utah would not assume jurisdiction. A
later conversation between the mother's attorney and the Commissioner indicated that the
commissioner had discussed the case with the judge and that the Ohio order would be
enforced. The father assumed custody of the child and left the state. This court determined

15

that the mother's due process rights had been violated. Since full faith and credit is only
afforded to orders issued with jurisdiction, the mother was entitled to a hearing on the
jurisdiction of the Ohio court. Holm, 840 P.2d at 164-65.
The Supreme Court of Delaware decided a case similar to this one in 1991. Yost v.
Johnson, 591 A.2d 178 (Del. 1991) (copy attached). The parties were divorced in
Pennsylvania, and the mother was granted custody of the children. The mother moved to
Virginia; the father moved to Delaware. A Virginia court modified the visitation schedule.
Subsequent to the modification, the mother moved to Italy. During one visit, the father
sought a modification of the Virginia decree in Delaware and did not return the chjldren to
the mother. After denying the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Delaware court awarded the father custody. The Delaware court accepted
jurisdiction based upon a conversation with the Virginia court in which the Virginia judge
deferred to Delaware.9 The mother claimed that the trial court violated her due process rights
by contacting the Virginia court without notifying her, by failing to allow the parties to
participate in the telephone call, and by not creating a record of the call. The court
determined that due process was violated by the judge's contact with the Virginia court. Id. at
182.
[T]he trial judge had a fundamental duty to notify the parties of the intended
communication in advance, and to permit them to meaningfully participate in
the discussion. Anything less does not comport with basic principles of due
process.

9

Unlike this case, Yost involved Section 3(4) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act. Section 3(4) allows a court to assume jurisdiction if no other state has jurisdiction
or a court with jurisdiction declines to exercise jurisdiction.
16

Id. The court noted that even if an emergency situation requiring the ex parte contact existed
the judge should have maintained a record of the communication and allow the parties to be
heard on the issues later. Id. Because the trial court failed to provide the mother jvith
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the court's actions were unconstitutional. Id.
The violation of Mike Liska's right to due process of law is not cured by the
availability of the Colorado forum. While the Utah Constitution does not require "due
process of law" to be provided by judicial action, it requires that the protection be provided
by the State of Utah. See e.g. Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070,
1074-75 (Utah 1981) (due process provided by Arbitration Act and therefore contract agreeing
to binding arbitration was constitutionally permissible). The State of Utah has no ability to
affect the remedies provided by another jurisdiction including Colorado. Therefore, the state
can not rely upon another jurisdiction to afford "due process of law."
Mike Liska was entitled to due process of law before he was deprived of his rights of
access to the courts and enforcement of his relationship with his children. The procedure
involved in the decision to defer to Colorado jurisdiction was not sufficient to protect Mike
Liska. Therefore, the trial court's acceptance of the Commissioner's recommendation was unconstitutional.
IV.

THE PROCEDURE USED BY THE COMMISSIONER TO DETERMINE THAT
UTAH COURTS WOULD NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION VIOLATED THE
OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Utah's Constitution contains the following Open Courts provision:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
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UTAH

CONST,

art. I, sec. 11. This provision "guarantees access to the courts and a judicial

procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry, 111 P.2d at 675. Under Section 11,
persons are entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for injuries to "person, property, or
reputation." Id. Mike Liska makes two related claims under the Open Courts provision. The
first is that the section of the UCCJA allowing Utah courts to defer its jurisdiction in favor of
another state with jurisdiction violates the Constitution. The second is that the process by
which the trial court and Commissioner declined jurisdiction in this case is unconstitutional.
Mike Liska has suffered injury to his "person, property, or reputation." Section 11 is
concerned with "the availability of legal remedies for vindicating the great interest that
individuals in a civilized society have in the integrity of their person, property, and
reputations." Id. at 677 n.4. Appellant has encountered repeated difficulty in enforcing his
visitation rights with his children as ordered by a Utah court. As discussed above in the due
process analysis, Mike Liska's constitutionally protected relationship with his children is
sustained through visitation. The important nature of the parent-child relationship should
compel consideration of an impairment of it to be an injury to Mike Liska's "person." Even if
the injury in not considered one to Mike Liska's "person," it certainly is encompassed in
"injury . . . in his . . . property." "Property" under the Open Courts provision "denotes a
broad range of interests that are secured by existing rules or understandings.'" Celebrity Club
Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm% 657 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982) quoting Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
The Open Courts provision restricts the power of the courts and the judiciary. Berry,
111 P.2d at 675. The focus of recent Utah appellate cases has been upon legislative
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enactments. E.g. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) (statute of
repose); Celebrity Club, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) (statute allowing deprivation of liquor
store lease without notice, hearing or judicial review). However, judicial actions are equally
constrained. See Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977) (dismissing a civil rights case
with prejudice on the basis of forum non conveniens contrary to state constitution); see also
Note, "Utah's Emerging Constitutional Weapon — The Open Courts Provision: Condemarin v.
University Hospital" 1990 B.Y.U.L.R. 1107, 1109 n.20 (the history of open courts provisions
indicates that they were intended as a "uniquely judicial guarantee") (emphasis deleted).
A.

The Court should apply heightened scrutiny to Mike Liska's claims under the
Open Courts provision.

The Utah appellate jurisprudence on the Open Courts provision has been active
recently. This Court has viewed Supreme Court precedent as implicating heightened scrutiny
for cases under the Open Courts provision. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). Generally, legislative enactments are entitled to a strong presumption of
validity. Id. at 1362 citing City ofMonticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah
1990).10 However, the level of scrutiny is raised when protected interests are implicated. Id.
at 1362.11 The level of review is determined by a study of two factors: the degree of

10

Justice Zimmerman has expressed the opinion that the burden shifts to the proponent to
justify limitation of access to the state courts. Currier, 862 P.2d at 1366 n.14. In a case
decided approximately two months after Currier, Justice Zimmerman, joined by Chief
Justice Hall, repeated the assertion that statutes challenged under the Open Courts
provision are presumptively unconstitutional. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 591 (Utah
1993) (Zimmerman, J. concurring in result).

11

Analysis under the Open Courts provision has been reinvigorated since the 1985 decision
of Berry v. Beech Aircraft. No \>os\-Berry cases was found discussing levels of scrutiny
of judicial (as distinct from legislative) action. This Court has implied that an abuse of
19

impairment of remedy and the nature of the right impaired. Id. at 1363.
A Utah court has the jurisdiction to enforce visitation ordered in a Utah divorce
decree. By deferring to the Colorado court, Mike Liska's right to have the Utah decree
enforced in Utah courts has been completely impaired. Therefore, the first criteria set out in
Currier supports review under a higher level of scrutiny.
As discussed above, Mike Liska's right to visitation emanates from the parent-child
relationship. By refusing to allow him enforcement of that right in Utah, a constitutionally
protected right is impaired. Thus, the second criteria in Currier also supports heightened
scrutiny.
B.

Section 7fs empowerment of courts to defer its jurisdiction to another state's
courts violates the Open Courts provision.

Mike Liska's first claim under the Open Courts provisions that allowing the trial court
to defer jurisdiction to the Colorado court denied Mike Liska "remedy by due course of
law."12 In Berry, the Utah Supreme Court established a two prong test for analyzing claims
under the Open Courts provision. First, the court must determine if the law provides an
effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of the
constitutional interest. Berry, 111 P.2d at 680. Second, if no substitute or alternative remedy
is provided, abrogation of the remedy is justified only if a clear social or economic evil is to

discretion standard of review applies to decisions under Section 7 of the UCCJA. Trent
v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1987) (upholding decision not to defer jurisdiction
stating that the court did not abuse its authority). The rationale that dictates a higher level
of scrutiny for statutes impairing significant interest applies to judicial actions. Therefore,
Appellant assumes that heightened scrutiny of judicial actions is appropriate.
12

This claim actually has narrow and broad aspect. This Court can invalidate Section 7
entirely or it can find that the deferral in this case was invalid.
20

be eliminated and elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means of achieving the objective. Id.
Under Berry the Court must first determine if the law has provided Mike Liska with
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy safeguarding his constitutionally protected
relationship with his children by due course of law. The fact that the Colorado court is
exercising jurisdiction over Mike Liska's children does not cure the constitutional defects in
the process used by the trial court. See Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 381 S.E.2d
445, 446 (N.C. 1989) (although an individual may have additional remedy in federal courts,
under open courts constitutional provision state courts can not fail to provide a forum).
The difference between the remedy provided in Utah and remedy provided in Colorado
has been recognized by the Supreme Court. The court in discussed the difference between
transferring a case within the state and dismissing under forum non conveniens. Summa
Corp. v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977).
In [a transfer situation], the defendant's motion is at least offering the plaintiff
the opportunity of a trial in another court. But, the granting of a motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens defeats the instant action
entirely. It turns the plaintiff out of court, and leaves him without remedy
except if he chooses to go to Florida, or some other state where the defendant
does business, and go through the process of instituting another lawsuit.
Id. at 546. Admittedly, Mike Liska will not have to institute another lawsuit to attempt to
enforce the Utah decree in Colorado. However, he will need to go to a different jurisdiction
and file the necessary motions to enforce his visitation, a process tantamount to filing a new
action.
Utah courts can utilize forum non conveniens in appropriate cases. However, under
policy emanating from, among other sources, the Open Courts provision, the court's discretion
21

is limited to "compelling circumstances." Id. at 546. These circumstances are where it
appears plaintiff has selected the forum to annoy or harass the defendant or factors of
inconvenience so preponderate against the case in Utah in favor of courts elsewhere. Id.
However, this case requires of an even more conservative approach. Unlike the contract
dispute at issue in Summa, the protection of Mike Liska's visitations has substantial
constitutional dimensions.
Although Utah courts have not ruled on this issue, the first prong of the Berry inquiry
should be limited to the jurisdiction of Utah. The Utah Constitution governs the activity of
this state's legislature and judiciary. The fact that an individual may be able to be heard in
another jurisdiction's court should be deemed insufficient to satisfy the requirement for an
effective and reasonable alternative.
Because no reasonable and adequate substitute remedy exists for Mike Liska, the
Court must make an inquiry into the second prong of the Berry analysis. The objective of
failing to provide Mike Liska a Utah forum for the continuing enforcement of the Utah
divorce decree must serve to eliminate a clear social or economic evil. If a clear social or
economic evil can be identified, the Court must determine if the elimination of the remedy is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the social or economic objective.
The UCCJA was enacted, among other reasons, to avoid jurisdictional competition and
conflict.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45c-l(l)(a) (1992). Accepting this as a clear social evil to be

addressed by the legislature, allowing deferral of jurisdiction was an arbitrary and
unreasonable means of achieving the objective. At the very least, the trial court's action
under Section 7 in this case was an arbitrary and unreasonable. The issue surrounding
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visitation could have been easily resolved in Utah. Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987)
(Utah court did not abuse discretion by entering order concerning visitation pursuant to a Utah
divorce decree even though children were with custodial parent in Idaho and had never lived
in Utah). The Utah courts entered the divorce decree that set out the visitation at issue here.
Any factors that may weigh in favor of Colorado jurisdiction are not sufficient to relieve the
Utah courts of the duty to allow Mike Liska remedies related to a Utah divorce decree.
C.

The procedure used by the Commissioner violates the Open Courts provision.

Mike Liska's second claim under Section 11 of the Utah Constitution does not address
the nature of the remedy afforded. Instead, the claim focuses upon the first clause of the
provision, "All courts shall be open." The Commissioner conducted the only fact finding
related to Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause, communication with the Colorado magistrate.
This conversation occurred without the presences of Mike Liska or his counsel and without
maintaining a record. This procedure violates the spirit and the letter of Section 11.
This portion of Mike Liska's Open Courts claim is similar to the notice and
opportunity to be heard under the state's due process clause. This claim is also cognizable
under Section 11. The Supreme Court has held, "By allowing plaintiff to be deprived of its
liquor store without notice, hearing or any judicial review, [the statute] offends against both
the Article I, Section 7 guarantee of due process and the Article I, Section 11 guarantee of
access to the courts." Celebrity Club, 657 P.2d at 1296. The Berry case states that Section
11 does not only guarantee access but also ensures a fair and equitable judicial procedure.
Berry, 111 P.2d at 675.
The Commissioner's communications with the Colorado magistrate should be
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considered a "court" for purposes of the Open Courts provision. The Commissioner was
acting under the direction of the trial court in its communication with Colorado. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3-31(7)(b) (1992) (the presiding judge in the district in which a commissioner
serves is responsible for the day to day supervision of that commissioner). By not affording
Mike Liska or his attorney notice or opportunity to be heard at the only fact finding stage of
the proceeding surrounding Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause, Mike Liska was denied his
constitutionally guaranteed right to a court that is "open."
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant requests that the order of the Third
District Court be reversed and the case be remanded to the District Court with instructions for
further proceedings consistent with this Court's decision.
DATED this 11th day of JulyHS94.

James A. ftlclntyre
Attorney for the Appellant

Margaret |§. Gentles
Attorney for the Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned certifies that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were sent
to Luetta K. Liska, Pro Se, 5632 Janna Drive, Loveland, Colorado 80538 this 11th day of
July, 1994.
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Vickers Energy Corp., Del.Supr., 429 A.2d
497 (1981).
Given the unusual history and circumstances of this case, we conclude that it
was error for the trial court to foreclose
equitable relief to any shareholder who surrendered his or her shares for payment of
the merger price by exclusion from the
class of minority shareholders entitled to
share in the quasi-appraisal remedy. All
class members who did not vote in favor of
the merger should receive the increased
valuation of $7.27 per share fixed by the
court.
*
*
*
*
*
*
The judgment of the Court of Chancery
is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in
part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Cathy S. YOST, Respondent
Below, Appellant,
v.
Loral JOHNSON, Petitioner
Below, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: Dec. 18, 1990.
Decided: April 12, 1991.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1991.

Father sought modification of custody
decree in order to obtain custody of children. The Family Court, Sussex County,
awarded custody to father, and mother appealed. The Supreme Court, Moore, J.,
held that trial court was without jurisdiction to determine custody dispute.
Reversed.

1. Constitutional Law <s=274(5)
Divorce <S=402(8)
Family court's ex parte communication
with judge in state which had issued custody decree, from which court determined
that it had jurisdiction over custody dispute
because other state had deferred adjudication to family court, violated due process
rights of parents; absent emergency, court
had duty to notify parties of intended communication in advance, so as to permit
them to meaningfully participate in discussion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Del.
C.Ann. Const. Art. 1, § 9; 13 Del.C.
§ 1903(4).
2. Trial ®=>21
Judge should not engage in substantive ex parte communication concerning
merits of issue pending before court; if
emergency requires such communication,
judge must at least maintain proper written record and thereafter provide parties
opportunity to be heard on issues relating
to, or arising from, such communication.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14; Del.C.Ann.
Const. Art. 1, § 9.
3. Divorce <s=>402(8)
Children's visitation with father in
state over period of several years did not
establish "significant connection" with
state, as required for exercise of jurisdiction over custody dispute; children had
continuously lived with custodial parent in
another jurisdiction, with their only prolonged contact in state occurring after noncustodial parent refused to return children
to custodial parent. 13 Del.C. § 1903(2).
4. Divorce <3=>402(8)
Father's affidavit, stating that he had
contacted "intake officers" in Virginia,
where custody decree had been entered,
and been advised to file his petition for
modification of custody in Delaware, where
he resided, because wife no longer resided
in Virginia, did not establish that Virginia
had deferred jurisdiction over custody dispute to Delaware, for purpose of establishing Delaware family court's jurisdiction
over dispute; "intake officers" had no judicial authority, and thus their opinions were
not entitled to any preclusive or conclusive
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effect in Delaware
§ 1903(4).

court.

13 Del.C.

Upon appeal from the Family Court.
REVERSED AND VACATED.
Aida Waserstein, Waserstein & Demsey,
Wilmington, for appellant.
Robert G. Gibbs, Wilson, Halbrook & Bayard, Georgetown, for appellee.
Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY and
MOORE, JJ.
MOORE, Justice.
This case arises out of a custody dispute
in Family Court between Loral R. Johnson,
a resident of Delaware, and Cathy S. Yost,
a resident of Vicenza, Italy. Two decisions
of that court are at issue. In the first case,
the Family Court held that it had subject
matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Act
("UCCJA") as enacted in Delaware. In its
second decision, the court awarded custody
of the parties' two children, Mark and Ian,
to their natural father, Loral R. Johnson.
We find that the Family Court never had
subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
The court deprived Yost of her due process
rights when it exclusively relied on an ex
parte communication to determine that Delaware was a proper forum under 13 DelC.
§ 1903(4). We also conclude that the trial
court had no jurisdiction in this case under
the UCCJA. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgments below in their entirety.
I.
Loral R. Johnson and Cathy S. Yost were
divorced in Pennsylvania on October 31,
1981. The original divorce decree contained a custody and visitation agreement
giving Yost custody of her two children.
Yost later moved to Virginia with the children, and Johnson moved to Delaware in
August, 1983.
On April 27, 1982, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, entered a new order which only
affected the visitation provisions of the
original Pennsylvania decree. Pursuant to

the new Virginia visitation schedule, Johnson was entitled to visit his children one
weekend per month, the first three weeks
of July, and alternating Christmas and
Thanksgiving holidays. Johnson regularly
visited his children between April, 1982 and
September, 1988.
Yost married an Air Force sergeant
while she was living in Virginia. The family mo^ -d to Italy in July, 1988, after Yost's
husband voluntarily accepted a four-year
military assignment. There was no evidence in the record that Yost's move surprised Johnson. There also was no evidence in the record that Johnson objected
to the move. The children next visited
Johnson in Delaware between June 5 and
July 25, 1989. At the end of the visit,
Johnson did not return the children to Italy
and attempted to modify the Virginia decree in Delaware.
A.
Johnson filed a petition in the Family
Court seeking emergency temporary custody of the children. The Family Court denied the motion, but scheduled the matter
for a hearing and issued an order prohibiting Johnson from removing the children
from Delaware. Yost arrived from Italy
and filed her own petition seeking the
court's permission to take the children to
Virginia pending the outcome of the Delaware proceedings. The court granted
Yost's petition. In re Johnson, Del.Fam.,
No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (July 27, 1989)
(ORDER). At the initial hearing, the court
issued a briefing schedule to address
Yost's challenge to the Family Court's jurisdiction. In re Johnson, Del.Fam., No.
89-7-119CV, Conner, J. (Aug. 7, 1989)
(EMERGENCY ORDER). The trial judge
permitted Yost to return to Italy with the
children while the matter was pending. Id.
Finally, on November 3, 1989, the trial
court issued its decision denying Yost's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See In re Johnson, Del.Fam.,
No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (Nov. 3, 1989)
(ORDER). The court held a trial on the
merits of Johnson's custody petition on
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April 25, 1990. The court rendered an oral
opinion awarding custody of both children
to Johnson on May 4, 1990. The court
memorialized its oral opinion in a written
order dated May 15, 1990. See In re Johnson, Del.Fam., No. 89-7-119CV, Millman,
J. (May 15, 1990) (ORDER).
Yost appeals to this Court, contesting
both: (1) the Family Court's Order dated
November 3, 1990, finding jurisdiction; and
(2) its decisions on the merits of the custody claim rendered in the Spring of 1990.
We heard oral argument on December 18,
1990, and immediately issued an order returning custody of Mark and Ian Johnson
to their mother. See Yost v. Johnson, Del.
Supr., No. 179, 1990, Moore, J. (Dec. 19,
1990) (ORDER). We stated in our order
that this opinion more fully explicating our
views would follow.
We conclude that it is unnecessary to
reach the merits of the Family Court's decision to award custody of Mark and Ian to
their natural father. We find that the
Family Court committed legal error, and
violated Yost's due process rights when it
ruled, on the basis of an ex parte communication with a Virginia court, that it had
subject matter jurisdiction to decide this
case under the UCCJA as enacted in Delaware. See 13 DeLC. §§ 1901-1925.
B.
The Family Court held that it had subject
matter jurisdiction to consider Johnson's
custody petition pursuant to Section Three
of the UCCJA. In re Johnson, Del.Fam.,
No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (Nov. 3, 1989)
(ORDER) ("ORDER"); 13 DeLC. § 1903.
Section Three of the UCCJA, as enacted in
Delaware, provides four distinct "tests" to
determine whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction:
(1) This State:
a. Is the home state of the child at
the time of the commencement of the
proceeding; or
b. Had been the child's home state
within 6 months before commencement
of the proceedings and the child is
1. 13 DeLC. § 1903(3) was not at issue in this

absent from this State because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons,
and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) It is in the best interests of the child
that a court of this State assume jurisdiction because:
a. The child and his parents, or the
child and at least 1 contestant, have a
significant connection with this State;
and
b. There is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection,
training and personal relationships; or
(3) The child is physically present in this
State and:
a. The child has been abandoned; or
b. It is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has been
subjected or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent; or
(4) It appears that no other state would
have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with subdivisions
(1), (2) and (3) of this section, or another
state has declined to exeHse jurisdiction
on the ground that this b.ate is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and it is in the best
interests of the child that this court assume jurisdiction
13 DeLC. § 1903 (emphasis added).
The trial court specifically rejected Johnson's arguments that it could accept jurisdiction under 13 DeLC. §§ 1903(1) & (2).1
See In re Johnson, Order at 3-4. The
court ruled that the "children did not have
a significant connection" to Delaware. Id.
at 4. However, the Family Court found
jurisdiction under 13 DeLC. § 1903(4), ruling that the Virginia Family Court had
effectively deferred adjudication of the custody issue to Delaware See 13 DeLC
§ 1903(4); In re Johnso , Order at 4.
The trial judge reached this conclusion
after consulting with Judge James W.
Fourqurean of the Virginia Juvenile and
case.
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Domestic Relations District Court, Nineteenth Judicial District in an ex parte telephone call. The Family Court Judge acknowledged:
I contacted the Honorable James W.
Fourqurean of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Judge Fourqurean deferred to this
Court the decision on the issue of custody of these children. His decision was
based on the fact that the respondent
and the children have not lived in Virginia since July 15, 1988. It was Judge
Fourqurean's belief that the issue of
domicile was not significant. It was
Judge Fourqurean's belief that the physical residence of the children was of more
importance than domicile since in deciding the issue of custody, consideration of
housing, schooling, neighborhood environment, friends, family and medical
needs, among other things, needed to be
examined and it was his belief these issues could only be properly addressed by
the courts of Delaware or Italy. In re
Johnson, Order at 3 n. 1 (emphasis added).
Even though there was no other record
of the t . \\ judge's conversation with Judge
Fourqurean, and no written decision to memorialize Judge Fourqurean's conclusions,
the Family Court decided that Virginia had
effectively "declined jurisdiction." Id. at 4.
See also In re Johnson, Del.Fam., No.
89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (May 15, 1990)
(ORDER) (Family Court can consider merits of custody petition because "Virginia
relinquished jurisdiction to this Court.").

Yost argues on appeal that the trial
court's reliance on 13 Del.C § 1903(4) was
totally misplaced. She claims that the
Family Court violated her rights to procedural due process when it: (1) contacted
the Virginia court without notifying the
parties; (2) failed to permit the parties to
participate in the telephone conversation;
and (3) failed to create or produce a written
record of the call. Yost also argues that
the trial court erred by not considering

Italy as a more proper forum to hear the
case under the UCCJA.
Johnson contends that the UCCJA authorized the trial judge to contact the Virginia
Court on an ex parte basis. He thus argues the Family Court did not violate
Yost's due process rights. Johnson also
claims that Virginia had effectively declined subject matter jurisdiction in this
case. He refutes Yost's argument that
Italy is the proper forum to consider this
case and maintains that Yost cannot raise
the issue of Italian jurisdiction for the first
time on appeal. Johnson finally argues
that the UCCJA prohibits the court from
considering Italy a proper forum even if
Yost could contest the Family Court's jurisdiction.
II.
We start with the relevant standard of
review. Yost contends that the trial court
violated her due process rights guaranteed
under the United States and Delaware Constitutions. She also claims that the Family
Court misapplied the UCCJA. This Court
will review questions of law de novo to
determine whether the trial court committed legal errors. See Ruggles v. Riggs,
Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 697, 703-04 (1984); Fiduciary Trust Co. N. Y. v. Fiduciary Trust
Co. N.Y., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927, 930
(1982).
A.
Turning to the merits of the appeal, we
find that the trial court's ex parte communication with the Virginia judge resulted in
a serious violation of Yost's constitutional
rights to procedural due process. See U.S.
CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. DEL. CONST,
art. I, § 9; cf State v. Rose, Del.Super.,
132 A. 864, 868-69 (1926) (meaning of "due
process" substantively same under United
States and Delaware Constitutions).
This Court has previously stated in Ruggles v. Riggs, Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 697 (1984)
that:
In the courts of Delaware persons are to
be accorded the most scrupulous adherence to the constitutional mandate of due
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process . . . The Family Court is no
exception to that unalterable rule. All
A.2d at 703 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
The hallmark of due process in a civil proceeding before a Delaware court is notice
and an opportunity to be heard. See Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., Del.Supr., 47 A.2d
479, 486, cert denied, 329 U.S. 808, 67
S.Ct. 620, 91 L.Ed. 690 (1946); Aprile v.
State, Del.Super., 143 A.2d 739, 744, affd,
146 A.2d 180 (1958). As the Superior Court
stated in Aprile:
Due Process in judicial proceedings implies action in conformity with the general law based upon evidence, and after a
full hearing upon notice to the party
or parties affected and an opportunity
to be heard. 143 A.2d at 744 (emphasis
added).
[1,2] The trial judge impermissibly contacted Judge Fourqurean without notifying
either Johnson or Yost. He then relied
upon this ex parte communication to reach
the conclusion that Virginia had effectively
surrendered jurisdiction over Johnson's
custody petition to the Delaware Family
Court. There is no evidence that the Family Court kept a written record of the conversation. There was neither notice nor an
opportunity for the parties to be heard on
this significant issue.
The trial judge's action in this case represents a departure from acceptable notions
of due process guaranteed under the Delaware Constitution. A judge should not engage in a substantive ex parte communication concerning the merits of an issue pending before the court. See, e.g., Ruggles,
All A.2d at 702 ("ex parte consultation by
a trial judge with experts has no place in
the judicial process."); Phillips v. Del.
Power & Light Co., Del.Supr., 216 A.2d
281, 285 (1966); Barks v. Herzberg, Del.
Supr., 206 A.2d 507, 509 (1965).
This case did not present an emergency
situation which might necessitate an ex
2. 13 Del.C § 1907(d) provides:
Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction, the court may communicate
with a court of another state and exchange
information pertinent to the assumption of

parte communication. Furthermore, even
in emergency situations, the trial judge
must at least maintain a proper written
record of the ex parte communication and
thereafter provide the parties the opportunity to be heard on the issues relating to,
or arising from, the communication. Absent an emergency, the trial judge had a
fundamental duty to notify the parties of
the intended communication in advance,
and to permit them to meaningfully participate in the discussion. Anything less does
not comport with basic principles of due
process. Eberly v. Eberly, Del.Supr., 489
A.2d 433, 440-43 (1985); Abdel G.S. v.
Badrban H.K., Del.Supr., 453 A.2d 94, 96
(1982).
Johnson also argues that the due process
issue is not dispositive because the UCCJA
encourages judges to communicate directly
with each other. He specifically claims
that the Family Court was authorized to
communicate directly with Judge Fourqurean under the forum non conveniens section of the UCCJA. See 13 Del.C.
§ 1907(d).2 On closer inspection, Johnson's
claim is meritless.
Johnson clearly confuses subject matter
jurisdiction with the doctrine oi forum non
conveniens.
Delaware has long recognized forum non conveniens as a common
law remedy enabling a court to transfer a
case to a venue more convenient to the
parties. See Miller v. Phillips Petroleum
Co. Norway, Del.Supr., 537 A.2d 190, 20102 (1988); Parvin v. Kaufman, Del.Supr.,
236 A.2d 425, 427 (1967); Dietrich v. Texas
Natl Petroleum Co., Del.Super., 193 A.2d
579, 584-88 (1963); Winsor v. United Airlines Inc., Del.Super., 154 A.2d 561, 563
(1958). An underlying assumption of the
forum non conveniens doctrine is that
both the original court and the proposed
new venue have subject matter jurisdiction
to consider the case. As the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled many
years ago, 'forum non conveniens can
never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction...." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
jurisdiction by either court with a view to
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by
the more appropriate court and that a forum
will be available to the parties.
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U.S. 501, 504, 67 S.Ct. 839, 841, 91 L.Ed.
1055 (1947) (emphasis added); Dietrich,
193 A.2d at 586.
The Delaware UCCJA does not modify
the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Section 1907(a) clearly provides that only "[a] court which has jurisdiction under this chapter" is authorized to
consider whether to apply the doctrine. 13
DelC. § 1907(a). The official commentary
to the UCCJA confirms that the forum
non conveniens section was intended only
as a secondary inquiry once a court had
already established primary subject matter
jurisdiction. See Comment UCCJA Section
Seven, reprinted in 1 J. McCAHEY, M.
KAUFMAN, C. KRAUT & J. ZETT,
CHILD CUSTODY VISITATION AND
LAW PRACTICE 3A-60 (1990) (Section
Seven "serves as a second check on jurisdiction once the test of sections 3 [13
DelC. § 1903] or 14 has been met")
B.
[3] Johnson also argues that resolution
of Yost's due process claim is not dispositive because the Family Court had an independent basis to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Johnson relies on an affidavit
he submitted to the trial court as conclusive proof that Virginia had declined jurisdiction. He therefore concludes that the
trial court properly considered his petition
under 13 DelC. § 1903(4).3
[4] According to his affidavit, Johnson
contacted a Fairfax, Virginia "intake officer" on July 24, 1989, and asked whether
he should file a custody modification petition in Virginia. This was almost at the
end of the children's visit in Delaware.
3. Johnson also argues that the Family Court
could have found subject matter jurisdiction under 13 DelC. § 1903(2) even if the court improperly assessed the Virginia jurisdiction question under 13 DelC. § 1903(4). Johnson claims
that he and the children established the statutorily mandated "significant connection" with Delaware through "a period of six years of visitation." 13 DelC. § 1903(2).
Johnson's claim is untenable given the Family
Court's reluctance to assume jurisdiction pursuant to 13 DelC. § 1903(2) when there is short
physical contact with Delaware and the bulk of
the treatment and care of the children is clearly
in another state. See Fielder v. Thorn, Del.Fam.,
525 A.2d 576, 579 (1987), Grayson v. Grayson,

The affidavit recites that the "intake officer" told Johnson to file his petition in
Delaware because "Mrs. Yost no longer
had residence or ties" in Virginia. The
affidavit also mentions that Johnson contacted a second Virginia "intake officer" on
July 28, 1989. This second "intake officer"
also advised Johnson to file a petition in
Delaware. Johnson's counsel admitted at
oral argument that Johnson never sought
the independent legal advice of Virginia
counsel either before or after his discussions with the two Virginia "intake officers."
We note that the trial court did not explicitly consider Johnson's affidavit when it
decided that it had subject matter jurisdiction. Nonetheless, we find that Johnson's
affidavit cannot serve as conclusive proof
that Virginia declined jurisdiction in this
case.
Article Four, Section One of the United
States Constitution provides that a state
court must give "Full Faith and Credit" to
the "judicial proceedings of every other
State." U.S. CONST. Art. 4, § 1. The
Delaware courts have long recognized that
the Full Faith and Credit clause is only
applicable where a foreign jurisdiction has
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendant and renders a
"duly authenticated" final decision. See,
e.g., Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Finance Corp., Del.Supr , 25 A.2d 383,
391, cert, denied, 317 U.S. 671, 63 S.Ct. 79,
87 L.Ed. 539 (1942); Bata v. Hill, Del.Ch.,
139 A.2d 159, 165 (1958); Brown v. Ins.
Equities Corp., Del.Ch., 21 Del.Ch. 273,
187 A. 18, 19 (1936); Sanson v. Sevison,
Del.Super., 396 A.2d 178, 181-82 (1978).
DelFam., 454 A 2d 1297, 1300 (1982) ("[t]he
term 'significant connection' is authoritatively
defined as maximum rather than minimum contact with the state and is intended to limit jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it.") (emphasis in original). The bulk of contacts in this
case is clearly not in Delaware. Especially in
view of Grayson, this Court cannot authorize the
Family Court to assume jurisdiction in a case
where the children continuously lived with their
mother in Italy for many years and the only
prolonged contact that Johnson and the children shared with Delaware occurred after Johnson refused to return his children to their mother. See, e.g., Grayson, 454 A.2d at 1300-01.
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Accordingly, Delaware will recognize a foreign judgment only if it was issued in conformity with due process. Id.
As reported in Johnson's affidavit, the
judgment of two Virginia "intake officers"
that Virginia did not have jurisdiction over
the modification of custody petition is not
entitled to any preclusive or conclusive effect in a Delaware court. There is absolutely no evidence that either "intake officer" was imbued with judicial authority.
Indeed, it is even questionable whether the
"intake officers" were authorized to give
the alleged advice attributed to them.
Even if Johnson's inquiries were somehow
deemed "judicial proceedings," the record
clearly indicates that the "proceedings" violated due process, because Yost had abso4.

We note that the Virginia court may have
deferred jurisdiction to Italy if Johnson had
filed his child custody modification petition in
Virginia. Yost argued that Italy could satisfy
the first two jurisdictional tests of UCCJA Section Three because the children had continuously resided in that country for at least one year
preceding Johnson's suit. Johnson, however,
correctly argued that Section Three only refers
to residence in a "state." He also correctly
claimed that the UCCJA defines a "state" as
"any state, territory or possession of the United
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
the District of Columbia." 13 DeLC. § 1902(10).
Johnson therefore concluded that the Italian
courts should never obtain jurisdiction.
No state court has yet resolved the issue
whether a foreign country can qualify as a
"state" within the meaning of Section Three of
the UCCJA. However, in a case that mirrors the
present dispute, the Virginia Supreme Court
ruled that England qualified as a "state" within
the meaning of the forum non conveniens section of the UCCJA. See Middleton v. Middleton,
227 Va. 82, 95, 314 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Va.1984).
Middleton involved a custody dispute between
a separated couple. The husband resided in
Virginia and the mother lived in England. According to a Virginia custody agreement, the
children lived in England and visited their father on summer vacations. 227 Va. at 88, 314
S.E.2d at 364. During one summer visitation,
the father decided not to return the children
and sought to modify the custody decree in
Virginia without warning his estranged wife.
Id. The mother flew to Virginia and took her
children back to England. Id. She then instituted a custody suit in the English courts and
requested the Virginia court to defer its judgment pending the outcome of the foreign suit.
Id.
The parties in Middleton both agreed that Virginia had subject matter jurisdiction. Instead,

lutely no notice or opportunity to contest
the "intake officers" findings.
We conclude that the trial court had no
authority to modify Johnson's custody petition under the UCCJA. The Family Court
violated Yost's due process rights, and
lacked an independent rationale to find subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA.4
Thus, the Family Court's decision to uphold
subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of
the default provision of 13 DeLC. § 1903(4)
was incorrect under the circumstances.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Family
Court are hereby REVERSED.

the mother requested Virginia to defer to the
English court's decision under the forum non
conveniens section of the UCCJA. The relevant
section of the Virginia version of the UCCJA
provides that a court should defer judgment if
"a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum." Id. at 94, 314 S.E.2d at 368 (emphasis
added).
Middleton decided to give the term "state" a
liberal interpretation to help effectuate the general purposes of the UCCJA. Id. The Virginia
Supreme Court reasoned that recognizing England as a "state" was justifiable under the
UCCJA because: (1) English law was very similar to Virginia jurisprudence; (2) England had
a closer connection between the mother and her
children; and (3) most of the relevant evidence
was located in England. Id. at 94-95, 314
S.E.2d at 367-68.
Middleton also recognized the procedural advantage the father obtained when he refused to
return his children to England. The court noted:
While father did not "snatch" the children in
the true sense of the word, he engaged in an
equivalent act by refusing to return them in
violation of a visitation agreement; he procured a tactical advantage by his conduct. Id.
at 95-96, 314 S.E.2d at 369.
We were also mindful of the tactical advantage Johnson secured when he "contacted" Virginia and then chose to file his petition in the
Delaware Family Court the next day. Johnson's
counsel even admitted at oral argument that the
Virginia court would probably have found that
Italy was a proper forum under Middleton. Although we express no view as to the motives
underlying Johnson's conduct in this matter, we
will not permit parties in a custody dispute to
"forum shop" with the Delaware courts in complete derogation of the stated purposes of the
UCCJA. Id. at 91-94, 314 S.E.2d at 366-367.

